Assmann's assessment that embracing Holocaust memory serves as a "reminder of the obligation to protect the rights of minorities," I show how in practice the interconnected commitments of European leaders to remember the Holocaust and fight antisemitism became one of the grounds for legitimizing racialization of immigrants and specifically Muslims, by singling them out as the main contemporary antisemites.
In Germany researchers consistently find that 25 -27 percent of the population hold Muslim Europeans, along with other non-Muslim activists, took part in anti-Zionist demonstrations and numerous times crossed the line towards antisemitism. To date, however, no study has proven that Muslim-background Germans are significantly more antisemitic than nonMuslim Germans. The most comprehensive study to date shows that 29 % of Muslims in Western Europe hold antisemitic prejudices. Although not a figure to be dismissed by any standards, it is important to note that it is only 2 points higher than the German average (27%) and much lower than the countries of origin in the Middle East and North Africa (74%). F In other words, the prejudices European Muslims hold show that in terms of their values they are part and parcel of the European society in which they live, even when they are not recognized as such.
While reports produced by the German government recognize the lack of evidence for higher D This number puts Germany ahead of more than half of other nations in the European Union.
See Anti-Defamation League, The ADL Global 100: An Index of Antisemitism, http://global100.adl.org/. E For the discussion of different studies whose findings were similar, see Germany, Bundesministerium des Innern 2011, 54-58. F http://global100.adl.org/#map/eeurope addition to reading government issued reports and calls for projects, it included participant observations of numerous antisemitism prevention programs devoted to Muslims developed by five different non-governmental organizations all receiving money from the earmarked sources from the government. Most of the research was conducted in Berlin, with several trips to towns and cities outside Berlin.
The concept of Muslim antisemitism became a public concern not only in Germany but throughout Europe, and for that matter in the United States, after 2000. When the failure of the Oslo Peace Accords led to the Second Intifada in Palestinian territories and mobilized sympathizers through Europe in protests against Israel that had antisemitic overtones, and at times was outright anti-Semitic, an alarmist discourse accused Muslims of a new antisemitism issue during the same conference was the question of slavery. In this meeting, a group of African countries asked for an apology and reparations from all countries that were involved in slavery,
based on the same model that payments were given to Jewish survivors and offspring of victims of the Holocaust. The United States from the beginning showed its reluctance to engage this topic by contributing only a minimal amount to the conference and keeping its representation to the minimum (Maran 2002) . The European countries agreed to increase aid to Africa but they refused to consider reparations. Both events led to a split between the affluent and white global North, on the one hand, and poor and brown and black South, on the other, in the way they approach issues relating to racism and discrimination. (Rensmann and Schoeps 2011, 52) . Such a view promoting the idea that antisemitism sees Jews as more powerful than other humans, while all other racisms regard the racialized subjects as lower forms, is widespread among antisemitism experts in Germany.
Jochen Müller, a leading expert on antisemitism among Muslims, has been active in promoting a total distinction between antisemitism and Islamophobia, going so far as to contend that no one organization can fight against the two. In a piece he wrote entitled "Islamophobie und Antisemitismus-Kritische Anmerkenungen zu einem fragwürdigen Vergleich" (Islamophobia and Antisemitism: Critical Comments on a Questionable Comparison), he argues that it is wrong to assume that "the two forms of discrimination are just different because they focus on different forms of victims, one Jews and the other Muslims" (2009, 24) . According to
Müller, "Islamophobia is based on culturalistic ascriptions that are typical of the new forms of racism. . . . . Muslims and their religion are discriminated against in a colonialistic and racist manner as unenlightened, terrorist, and backward" but are not under the threat of being exterminated (ibid.). The problem with this view is that it does not recognize that antisemitism was not originally a policy of extermination, and that it is an ideology that took on different degrees and shades of meaning over the centuries, and has done so even in modern times. This view approaches all manifestations of antisemitism as equivalent to Nazism and hence makes any comparison between antisemitism and any other racism that is not genocidal untenable.
More problematically, and typical of antisemitism experts in Germany, Müller also adds that antisemitism is based on fantasy, whereas Islamophobia is based on reality: conference participants were attacked as scholars. W Benz was even indirectly accused for being a Nazi by those who brought up the fact that his PhD advisor was a member of the Nazi party.
X
It is important to note that as late as in the 1990s -a particularly bad decade for immigrants in Germany --it was not so impolitic to think about antisemitism and discrimination against Muslims together. Especially following the fire bombings of Turkish houses in 1992 in
Mölln and in 1993 in Solingen, which killed several Turks, including one family of three generations, Turkish German activists began to attract public attention by likening their situation to that of the Jews. After the events, protestors carried banners that read, "We do not want to be the Jews of tomorrow" (Bodemann and Yurdakul 2006 German media, and watch the same entertainment programs as their nonimmigrant fellow youth.
In the report, there is even a discussion of how Turkish media are no longer relevant to German Turks. It is admitted that the sales of Turkish-language newspapers in Germany have been decreasing over the past few decades, and currently do not total more than 60,000 copies. This is probably because "the readers have no direct connection to Turkey. Additionally, the younger generations do not know the Turkish language well enough, and Turkish newspapers lack a connection to the reality of migrants in Europe" (Germany, Bundesministerium des Innern 2011, 110). However, the report argues, the parents and grandparents of these young people follow the media from their homelands and then pass on the antisemitic ideas they acquire in this way to their children and grandchildren (ibid., 110) --a proposition that is not supported by any evidence. This statement also seems counter intuitive since antisemitism among Muslims has never been an issue of public concern in the 1960s, 70s, 80s, or even 90s, when, according to this line of thinking, anti-Semitic tendencies should have been the strongest among immigrants freshly arrived from the Middle East.
The argument, which denies that a distinct Muslim antisemitism exists, but nonetheless 
Producing Nationality-Specific Antisemitisms
Even though antisemitism experts in Germany often discuss Arabs and Turks together as carriers of the new wave of antisemitism, a careful analysis of reports and projects shows that different sources of the problem and cures for it are assigned to each of these national groups. Most of the antisemitism-prevention training I observed in Berlin was aimed at Arabs, and more specifically at Palestinian refugees, although without always naming them as such. As the largest group of Muslims in Germany, Turkish immigrants also receive considerable attention. Discourses and prevention methods regarding each group as well as the attitudes of trainers differed significantly for each ethnic group. Trainers I talked to mentioned that the groups were so different that it did not always make sense to keep them together.
In nationality specific antisemitism prevention trainings, Turks are assumed to be suffering from a false "myth of tolerance"-a collective false sense that Turks have a history of good relations with Jews. Arabs are assumed to be suffering from a collective pathology of "self- Because they assume the transmission of Turkish antisemitism to be strictly genealogical, This very workshop was also taught to teenagers of Turkish background without success.
It quickly became clear that the workshop materials, which consisted of texts from Turkishlanguage newspapers had to be translated into German. But even then, having grown up in Germany and not in Turkey, the teenagers had a difficult time following the conspiracy theories involved. Trainers told me that young people of Turkish background in Germany are not well educated enough to understand newspaper articles, which was why they had stopped doing this workshop with them. I disagree, because the articles used in the workshop are all written in simple language and are geared toward poorly educated readers in Turkey. Rather, what young Turkish Germans lack is familiarity with the convoluted logic of Turkish conspiratorial thinking, to which they are not exposed growing up in democratic Germany.
Needless to say, antisemitism does exist in Turkey and did in the past too. Latest AntiDefamation League survey shows 69% of Turks hold anti-Semitic prejudice, a number that puts it far ahead of Iran, with an index of 56%. GG Especially since a race-based nationalism was embraced following the foundation of the Turkish Republic, Turkish Jews and the descendants of Jewish converts to Islam have been subjected to severe forms of discrimination (Baer 2013a , Bali 1999 , Brink-Danan 2012 , Guttstadt 2013 . It is also true that a myth of tolerance with regard to Jews has been promoted by the Turkish government, especially in the 1990s, to counter the accusations regarding the Armenian Genocide (Baer 2013b) . Still, all these facts do not justify Unaware of the long Jewish presence in Turkey, they were completely ignorant of the myth of Ottoman tolerance of Jews that is believed to beresponsible for antisemitism among this population. The trainer who worked with them for about a year for this project told me that she actually did not encounter anti-Semitic tendencies in the group. This specific group of fifteen students might not be completely representative, but as bright students at an academic track high school, it is safe to assume that the majority of the Turkish German population could not be any more informed about the realities and myths that relate to the Jews of Turkey. Ironically, it seems that without the translations and teaching of the organizations in Germany that seek to combat antisemitism, the antisemitic writings that appear frequently in Turkish-language media in Turkey would not be as readily available to Turkish German youth as the experts assume them to be.
Persuading Young Palestinians that they are not victims
If the "myth of tolerance" is the target of antisemitism prevention programs for Turks, the myth that is aimed to be broken for Arabs in general and Palestinians in specific is "self- According to another participant in the conference, Jochen Müller, the independent researcher who wrote the Amira report on Turkish antisemitism, this feeling of "selfvictimization" and "the desire for pride and power," is not an effect of living in Europe as a marginalized subject, but rather "was and is imported to Europe by many [Arab] migrants from the region." Furthermore "self-victimization" is a crucial part of an ideology of collective identity and is passed on from generation to generation" (Müller 2007, 36 According to the brochure, the exercise seeks "to sensitize teenagers for change in society and to question historical narratives that are used to legitimize territorial claims." In order to achieve this goal, the training program focuses on how the region was ruled by different groups; 
Conclusion
In a continent laden with antisemitic history, public intellectuals and policy makers search the suitcases of immigrants to find the source of contemporary antisemitism. There is no question that immigrants arrive with their own memories, attitudes, and ideologies in general (Rothberg and Yildiz 2011) and about Jews in specific. But it is equally obvious that the European wardrobes into which immigrants place these beliefs and dispositions have never been completely cleansed of antisemitism. Furthermore, Muslim youth who are the main suspects in the imported antisemitism narrative actually never migrated to Europe. The antisemitism they might be holding on to is part and parcel of life in the major European cities in which they grew up. So, how do we explain the popularity of the suitcase metaphor or the export-import theory to explain contemporary antisemitism in Europe? At the same time, putting the focus of the antisemitism prevention campaign on Muslims shifts the blame to relative newcomers to European society, who are still commonly called "foreigners" (auslander) in Germany. Accusing immigrants, or rather the grandchildren of immigrants, of having imported antisemitism to the continent effectively hides non-immigrant European and German antisemitism. Despite the heightened attention paid to antisemitism and Holocaust memory in Germany, observers concur that increasing numbers of Germans report being weary of hearing about the Holocaust and no longer want to feel guilty (Margalit 2010 , Markovits 2006 . Indeed, a 2004 study shows that more than 60% of Germans agreed with the statement that they were tired of being told about the crimes against Jews, and they were angry that Germans were still considered responsible for them (Bergmann 2008, 45 It is important to acknowledge that the export-import theory of antisemitism accuses
Muslims of being carriers of antisemitism, but attributes its origin to Europeans and more specifically to Germans. The theory blames Muslims for holding onto an antisemitism that European missionaries and German Nazis taught them in the first place. Turkish and Arab cultures are depicted as quick to learn antisemitism but not equipped with the moral fiber necessary to regret it. Antisemitism prevention reports fault Turks for holding onto a myth of tolerance towards Jews that makes them wrongly feel superior to Europeans. The same reports criticize Arabs for clinging to a mistaken sense of victimhood as well as an ill-founded desire for power and pride. The antisemitism prevention programs designed for Muslims aim to break down these self-perceptions. Turkish-background Germans are told that their forefathers were not really virtuous to Jews, and Arab-background Germans, specifically Palestinians, are taught that their Arab grandfathers collaborated with the Nazis and then sold their land to Jewish settlers. The export-import theory attributes the origins of antisemitism to Europeans, but it stresses the inadequacies of Turkish and Arab cultures, posing them as obstacles to a proper, or properly European, repentence.
Understanding antisemitism as a malignant ideology brought back to Europe by Muslims produces perpetrators out of marginalized, racialized, and disadvantaged people. When it is established that Muslims are antisemitic -and worse, do not atone for it -it becomes difficult to recognize their victim position in relation to European racism. Critical race theorists of Europe have already pointed out that European variants of racism are built on an ideology of a racial blindness that persistently ignores contemporary racial differences and, as a result, is oblivious to ongoing racist practices in Europe. They also agree that the memory of the extreme manifestation of racism that led to the Holocaust is partly responsible for this racial blindness, and hence blindness to racism (Goldberg 2006 , El-Tayeb 2008 , Partridge 2010 . In that respect, the discourse of Muslim antisemitism works in a similar fashion to its sister discourses about Muslim sexism (Ewing 2008) 
